This paper extends the literature on predatory short selling and bailouts through a joint analysis of the two. We consider a model with informed short sales, as well as uninformed predatory short sales, which can trigger the inefficient liquidation of a firm. We obtain several novel results: A government commitment to bail out insolvent firms with positive probability can increase welfare because it selectively deters predatory short selling without hampering desirable informed short sales. Contrasting a common view, bailouts can be optimal ex ante but undesirable ex post. Furthermore, bailouts in our model are a better policy tool than short selling restrictions. Welfare gains from the bailout policy are unevenly distributed: shareholders gain while taxpayers lose. Bailout taxes allow ex ante Pareto improvements.
INTRODUCTION
In a seminal paper Miller (1977) shows that short selling is crucial for market efficiency. If investors differ in their expectations, and short selling is not possible, prices do not aggregate the views of pessimists and optimists because the latter end up trading with themselves. In recent financial crises, this beneficial view of short sales has been challenged. A purported strategy is to depress market prices though aggressive short selling, hoping that this triggers a panic or valuedestroying actions by the shorted company. Concerned about this possibility of predatory short selling, regulators around the world have temporarily banned short selling activities. 1 Another policy instrument in recent crises was government bailouts. They came in various forms such as capital injections, cheap credit or asset purchases above market prices. One link between short selling and bailouts is that a firm that is put in distress by short selling may ask for a bailout. This papers highlights another effect: an ex ante commitment to bailing out distressed firms with positive probability can make socially harmful short-selling strategies less attractive without hampering desired short sales.
1. The SEC, for example, motivated the 2008 short selling ban by stating: 'Recent market conditions have made us concerned that short selling in the securities of a wider range of financial institutions may be causing sudden and excessive fluctuations of the prices of such securities in such a manner so as to threaten fair and orderly markets' (SEC, 2008, p. 1) Specifically, we study a firm that needs to refinance its debt in order to complete a long-term investment project. A strategic trader either has superior negative information about the project and thus conducts desirable informed short sales, or the trader is uninformed but nevertheless considers a predatory short selling strategy. There is also a continuum of rational but uninformed competitive financial investors. As these investors cannot distinguish informed from uninformed short sales, the latter can be wrongly interpreted as a signal for a bad firm. In such a case, inefficient liquidation of an attractive project can lead to a decline in prices, which leaves the predatory short seller with a profit.
In this context, a commitment of the government to bail out a distressed firm with a positive probability can prevent predatory short sales while not reducing the frequency of informed short sales. Due to this deterrence effect, a positive bailout probability can increase the efficiency of financial markets as well as total welfare. A short sale ban, by contrast, would prevent both informed and uninformed short selling, and is therefore inferior in the model that we study.
Our results are not only new because they shed light on the possible connections between short selling and bailouts. They also add new aspects to the understanding of bailouts.
First, we find a commitment problem that is opposite to the common commitment problem in the literature. Starting with Thornton (1802) 2 the literature highlights undesired effects of bailout policies on risk taking, and outlines strategies for dealing with the time inconsistency that can arise because a bailout may be welfare optimal ex post, but not necessarily ex ante (e.g., Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Bernardo et al., 2016; Chari and Kehoe, 2013; Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Mailath and Mester, 1994) . In our model, the ex ante effect of bailouts is positive because they suppress predatory short sales. Ex post, the insolvency probability is so high that the government would always prefer not to bail out the firm.
Our model abstracts from exogenous externalities of bailouts for the sake of a clear exposition of the effects that are novel to the literature. Bailouts can have positive externalities if they help avoid negative feedback effects between banks (e.g., modeled in Philippon and Schnabl, 2011) , improve creditor confidence (Cheng and Milbradt, 2012) , or secure benefits that stakeholders derive from a continued existence of the firm (Bernardo et al., 2016) . On the other hand, funding the bailouts can lead to costs in the form of tax-induced inefficiencies and higher sovereign credit risk (Acharya et al., 2015; Bernardo et al., 2016) .
Even though we abstract from such exogenous externalities of bailouts, Bagehot's dictum that only solvent firms with good collateral should be bailed out does not hold in our model. 3 If a welfare optimal bailout policy fully deters predatory short sales, remaining short sales are always informed and a bailout after a short sale always rescues an insolvent firm.
2. 'It is by no means intended to imply, that it would become the Bank of England to relieve every distress which the rashness of country banks may bring upon them: the bank, by doing this, might encourage their improvidence' (Thornton, 1802, p. 188) . 3. 'Advances should be made on all good banking securities' (Bagehot, 1873, ch. VII.II) . An example for a policy reference to this dictum is Bernanke's (2008) statement on Lehman Brothers: 'A public-sector solution for Lehman proved infeasible, as the firm could not post sufficient collateral to provide reasonable assurance that a loan from the Federal Reserve would be repaid'.
As in Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2014) , Goldstein and Guembel (2008) and Liu (2015) , aggressive shorting can be profitable because it triggers inefficient actions by the shorted company. These studies, which do not consider bailouts, find that short selling restrictions can be welfare increasing. In our model, a bailout policy dominates short sale restrictions because it selectively reduces predatory short sales while keeping informed short sellers in the market. Consistent with these results and the intense use of bailouts by governments, empirical studies on the financial crisis suggest that short selling during the financial crisis did not have a strong destabilizing impact (Bailey and Zheng, 2013) and that short sale restrictions largely failed to achieve the aim of stabilizing prices (cf. Beber and Pagano, 2013; .
Though much of the recent policy debate and many academic papers focus on financial institutions, we study a generic firm that could as well be an industrial or service firm. Direct support of non-financial firms is common. Examples in the United States include loans to airlines in 2001, and to Chrysler and General Motors in 2008. International datasets compiled by Faccio et al. (2006) and Smith (2012) contain many bailouts of non-financial firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The Section 2 introduces the basic model without bailouts. The Section 3 discusses the effects and comparative statics of bailouts and short sales. The Section 4 studies further aspects. We first discuss why a private commitment to refinance after a short sale is less efficient and credible to deter predatory short sales than a bailout policy. We then discuss incorporation of additional signals in the bailout decision and compare the bailout policy with a policy that simply forbids short sales. The Section 5 briefly concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
BASIC MODEL WITHOUT BAILOUTS
This section develops and analyzes a basic model without bailouts. In a nutshell, we study a firm that can be a good or bad type, with all assets invested in a risky project. Majority shareholders are small, risk-neutral competitive investors that do not know the firm's type and must decide on premature liquidation of the project or refinancing it from a competitive fringe of bond investors. There is a strategic trader, who learns with positive probability the firm's type and can trade in the stock market before the liquidation decision. In equilibrium, short sales are a noisy, informative signal about a bad firm type and can thus increase interest rates and trigger liquidation. In a predatory short sale, the trader has no information that the firm is a bad type but still benefits due to the triggered liquidation.
Firm and investment project
There is a firm that has its entire assets invested in a risky project. The time line of the model is characterized by three dates t 1 , t 2 and t 3 as illustrated in Figure 1 .
At t 1 nature draws the firm's type h, which can be good, h = g, or bad, h = b. The probability of a good type is given by Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts
The type determines the success probability p h of the firm's investment project, with p g >p b . We denote by
the expected success probability given that the firm's type is unknown. The project's payoff realizes at t 3 .
The resulting value of the firm's assets is given by
The firm is financed with equity and debt. Without loss of generality, we normalize the number of publicly traded stocks to 1. The firm must repay its debt in t 2 . The repayment amount (including interest) is D. We assume that the firm can refinance its debt by raising D dollars of new short-term debt maturing at t 3 from a competitive fringe of passive bond investors. If the firm fails to refinance its debt, it cannot continue the risky project, which will then be prematurely liquidated.
Liquidation shall yield a fixed liquidation value of L, which is independent of the firm's type. The decision to liquidate a firm shall be endogenously made by the shareholders in our model. Consequently, we assume that the liquidation value is high enough to pay back current creditors: L > D. Otherwise, the details of the country's bankruptcy laws would be crucial for modeling the liquidation decision, e.g., if L < D bankruptcy laws may have required liquidation already before t 2 .
We assume that it is socially efficient to liquidate a bad firm, i.e.,
This condition will make informed short sales that trigger liquidation of a bad firm type beneficial from a welfare perspective. On the other hand, it shall be efficient to refinance a firm whose type is unknown
This condition has the effect that a predatory short sale which triggers liquidation even though the firm type is unknown will reduce welfare. 
Strategic trader and passive investors
We have a risk-neutral strategic trader who initially holds no shares of the firm. With probability k the strategic trader becomes informed at time t 1 and learns the firm's type h (good or bad). Otherwise he remains uninformed and only knows the commonly known distribution of the firm types. Between t 1 and t 2 , the strategic trader can trade the firm's shares in the market.
We model the strategic trader's activities in a very simple fashion: based on his obtained information, he chooses one of three possible trading actions a 2 {s,0,'}. The action a = s indicates that a fixed number of shares is sold (short position), a = ' means that the same fixed amount is bought (long position) and a = 0 means that no trades take place. We do not explicitly model the counterparties of the strategic trader, but assume a simple mechanism how he impacts prices. This mechanism and a description of the strategic trader's payoff function will be relegated to the next subsection.
At t 2 , the trade activities of the strategic trader are observed by risk-neutral, small passive investors. There are two groups of passive investors: a competitive fringe of bond investors and the majority shareholders of the firm. Based on the observed strategic trader's action a and the trader's equilibrium strategies, both groups form identical rational equilibrium beliefspðaÞ about the firm's success probability. Details of the belief formation are part of the equilibrium outcome characterized in Section 2.5. Except for the firm type and whether or not information was revealed to the strategic trader, all actions and parameters are commonly known to passive investors and the strategic trader.
The competitive fringe of bond investors offers to refinance the firm in t 2 at an interest rate i. Bond investors' resulting payoff per unit investment is given by 0 if the project is not refinanced i if the project is refinanced and successful À1 if the project is refinanced and fails 8 < :
The offered interest rate i is characterized by the usual zero expected profit condition for a competitive fringe:
Since the beliefs about the success probabilitypðaÞ depend on the strategic trader's action, the zero profit interest rate depends on the strategic trader's action as well, which we indicate by the notation i(a).
The passive investors who are shareholders hold the majority of the firm's stocks. They decide in t 2 whether the project shall be refinanced at interest rate i (a), which they take as given, or be liquidated. Shareholders' resulting payoff per share is given by
if the project is liquidated v À Dð1 þ iðaÞÞ if the project is refinanced and successful 0 if the project is refinanced and fails
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If at t 2 the project is not liquidated, shareholders expect a payoff of
It follows that shareholders strictly prefer liquidation over refinancing if and only if liquidation proceeds are larger than the expected value of the project
This means that conditional on their belief, shareholders perform the welfare optimal liquidation decision. In our model, there is no conflict of interest between passive shareholders and creditors that would lead to effects like gambling for resurrection. The only potential source of inefficiencies will be the behavior of the strategic trader.
Stock prices and strategic trader's payoff
If the strategic trader buys or sells stocks, we assume that he keeps the stocks until the firm's project realizes in t 3 or the firm is liquidated in t 2 .
The stock price p t in period t shall be equal to the expected shareholders' payoff per share, with the expectations being based on the knowledge of passive investors. The stock price in period 2 is thus given by
At this point, we do not provide an explicit formula for the initial stock price p 1 since it depends on the equilibrium strategy of the strategic trader. Yet, we will show in our equilibrium characterization below that stock prices will increase from period 1 to period 2 if the strategic trader buys shares, since this will be an informative signal about a good firm type. The reverse holds true if the strategic trader goes short in the firm's shares.
We do not explicitly model the counterparties of the strategic trader. Instead, we simply assume that the effective price at which the strategic trader buys or shorts stocks shall be a linear combination between the prices in period 1 and 2:
The parameter a 2 (0,1) measures the trader's ability to complete his order in the market before influencing the price. If we had a = 1, he is able to conduct his complete trade at the original price p 1 , i.e., his trade moves the price only after it is completed. The opposite case of a = 0 would mean that the strategic trader is only able to trade at the price that results after the market has updated the stock price based on the information that there is a buy or sell order by the strategic trader. 4 If the strategic trader buys stocks (a = ') his utility is equal to the final payoff per share, see equation (6), minus the price p a , if he sells short (a = s) the utility 4. A price between p 1 and p 2 would also arise in full-fledged dynamic models of market micro structure, like Kyle (1985) . In the Kyle model informed traders get quotes from market makers, who cannot perfectly distinguish between uninformed noise traders and informed traders.
is equal to the price p a minus the final payoff per share, and if he trades nothing, his payoff is 0. 5
Overview of equilibrium outcome
At its core, our model describes a signaling game between the strategic trader and the passive investors who form their beliefspðaÞ. Unfortunately, signaling games are notorious for multiple equilibria and the necessity of equilibrium refinements to pick sensible equilibria. This requires a careful, somewhat technical analysis that is relegated to the next subsection. In this subsection, we will give a verbal overview of the intuitive results. An informed strategic trader will act on his superior information about the firm's type. He will buy shares when the good type is revealed and short shares if the firm is a bad type.
Thus, the passive investors rationally reduce their beliefpðaÞ about the firm's success probability when they observe a short sale. This also means that the firm's interest rate i(a) for refinancing its debt goes up after a short sale. As a consequence, a short sale can induce passive shareholders to prematurely liquidate the project instead of refinancing it.
A premature liquidation causes the stock price to drop to L À D, a level below the initial price p 1 . This price drop is independent of the actual type of the firm. If the likelihood of premature liquidation is sufficiently high, short sales are profitable for an uninformed strategic trader who has no information that the project is bad. We call such short sales (socially inefficient) predatory short sales as they are welfare reducing. One can think of uninformed strategic traders who perform predatory short sales to free-ride on the fact that passive investors cannot distinguish between informed and predatory short sales.
Formal analysis of equilibrium outcome
In this subsection, we will develop the relevant results of the equilibrium outcome formally. We start with a rather technical assumption, to exclude equilibria that are sustained by counterintuitive out-of-equilibrium beliefs of passive investors.
Assumption 1 (Out-off equilibrium beliefs) Consider an equilibrium in which the probability that the strategic trader buys (short sells) shares is 0. Then the out-off equilibrium event that the strategic trader buys (short sells) shares should neither 1. Reduce passive investors' belief that the trader was informed and knows that the firm type is good (bad), nor 5. To be precise, the monetary payoffs of the strategic trader must be multiplied by the number of shares the strategic trader trades. Since we assume that he buys and sells the same fixed number, we can normalize his cardinal utility function as if he bought or sold exactly one share. This simplifies notation and we do need not introduce another variable that describes the trade volume of the strategic trader.
2. Increase passive investors' belief that the trader was informed and knows that the firm type is bad (good).
We now establish
Lemma 1 In every equilibrium, the initial share price satisfies
Lemma 1 is straightforward and holds since passive investors are perfectly rational and know the equilibrium strategies of the strategic trader. Therefore, they cannot be systematically fooled into a liquidation strategy that leads to a lower expected value than the strategy to simply never liquidate the project.
The next result establishes that an informed trader who knows that the firm is a bad type will always perform short sales.
Lemma 2 In every equilibrium, an informed trader always performs short sales a = s if the revealed firm type is bad h = b.
Non-surprisingly, an informed trader who knows that the firm type is good benefits from buying the firm's shares. However, it might even become profitable for an informed trader who knows that the firm is a good type to perform a short sale if that short sale triggers a liquidation with sufficiently high probability. There will never be an equilibrium in which a trader who knows that the firm is good always performs short sales, since then short sales would not be informative anymore and no liquidation would ever take place. Yet, in certain parameter ranges, we could have a mixed strategy equilibrium in which such a trader mixes between buying the stock and short selling it. To avoid tedious and uninteresting case distinctions, we will rule out this case in the subsequent analysis.
Assumption 2 We restrict attention to cases in which an informed trader who knows that the firm is a good type always buys shares in equilibrium.
Given this behavior of the strategic trader, it will never be rational for competitive investors to liquidate the project if no short sales are observed. But since short sales become an informative signal for a bad firm type, liquidation after short sales can become rational for the shareholders. Let q be the probability that an uninformed trader performs a predatory short sale (we allow for mixed strategies). The higher the probability of predatory short sales q, the less likely it is that an observed short sale was conducted by an informed trader and the less likely is a bad firm type; thus, the less inclined will shareholders be to liquidate. We find the following result.
Lemma 3 For passive investors, it will be (weakly) profitable to liquidate the project after having observed short sales if and only if the probability q that uninformed traders perform predatory short sales is (weakly) below a critical level q ð1 À cÞ k ð1 À kÞ
If q [ 1 the shareholders will always prefer to liquidate the project after a short sale, independent of the frequency of short sales by an uninformed strategic trader. We will restrict attention to this case in our subsequent analysis.
Assumption 3 Henceforth, we assume q [ 1, i.e., after short sales passive shareholders always prefer to liquidate the project.
Given that short sales always trigger liquidation, after a short sale the share price drops to
and the predatory short seller always benefits from the short sale. We thus find for our basic model without bailouts the following result:
Proposition 1. Absent bailouts and given q [ 1 an uninformed strategic trader will always perform a predatory short sale, and every short sale triggers a liquidation of the project.
BAILOUTS AND SHORT SALES

Overview of bailouts
We now study the effects of a bailout policy on the prevalence of predatory and informed short sales and on total welfare. We consider bailouts of the following form: in case that refinancing conditions for a firm are so expensive that it chooses to liquidate the project, the government can offer a cheaper loan that prevents this liquidation (debt bailout). In this section, we assume that the government has the same information as passive investors, i.e., it has no superior information about the firm's type.
We consider bailouts in which the government pays not more for the bailout than is necessary to prevent liquidation. This means the bailout loan is given at an interest rate i* such that the shareholders are indifferent between refinancing and liquidating, i.e.p ðsÞðv À ð1 þ i Ã ÞDÞ ¼ L À D:
As will become evident from the analysis below, i* is the lowest interest rate that still guarantees that an informed short seller will not be harmed by a bailout. We assume that the government can commit ex ante to a bailout policy that triggers a bailout with a fixed probability b 2 [0,1] if absent bailouts the project were liquidated. The assumption that bailouts are decided purely randomly Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts allows us to cleanly show how a positive bailout probability can be efficient, even absent any superior information by the government. In Section 4, we will discuss the case in which the government receives a private signal about the firm's type before the bailout decision. Instead of randomizing, it will then be optimal to perform bailouts for those firms whose signal indicates a higher likelihood of a good project.
The key reason why such bailouts can act as a screening device that selectively deter predatory short sales is that they affect expected profits of informed and uninformed short sellers in a different direction. An informed short seller knows that the firm is a bad type for which liquidation would be efficient. By preventing the efficient liquidation, the bailout reduces resulting share prices, which increases the expected profits of an informed short seller. In contrast, given the lack of information of a predatory short seller, the expected firm value after the bailout is larger than its liquidation value. Therefore, by preventing an inefficient liquidation a bailout reduces profits of a predatory short seller.
Ex post effect of bailouts
Consider the situation that after a short sale, a bailout is decided in t 2 . While passive investors and the government believe the success probability of the firm to bepðsÞ, an informed short seller knows that the success probability is p b and an uninformed predatory short seller knows that the expected success probability is p u . Since an informed trader performs a short sale if and only if he knows that the firm is a bad type, we have
For the subsequent analysis, we use the index j 2 {u,b} to denote a short seller's type, characterized by his knowledge about the firm: we have j = u for an uninformed predatory short seller and j = b for an informed short seller. After a bailout has been decided in t 2 , a short seller of type j has the following expectation about the resulting share price in p 3 :
where we find the second line by plugging in condition (14) for the bailout interest rate i*. Using this condition and (15), we also find p 3 ðbÞ L À D\ p 3 ðuÞ:
This means a bailout weakly benefits an informed short seller, since expected resulting share prices in t 3 fall below the share price under liquidation. Given that the success probability is p b , a bailout lets a bad firm survive for one period longer and thereby destroys shareholders' value compared to an immediate liquidation. On the other hand, a bailout reduces profits, possibly leading to losses, for an uninformed predatory short seller, since, given his knowledge, the bailout raises expected share prices above the share price under liquidation. We summarize this result in Lemma 4 Ceteris paribus, a bailout in period 2 weakly increases the expected profits of an informed short seller, but strictly reduces expected profits of an uninformed predatory short seller.
Bailout policy that deters predatory short sales
We now study how a commitment to a bailout probability b affects ex ante profits and equilibrium behavior of short sellers. A short seller's ex ante expected profit per share is equal to the expected cash gain G j from the transaction. It is given by G j ðbÞ ¼ p s ðbÞ À ðb p 3 ðjÞÞ þ ð1 À bÞðL À DÞÞ ð18Þ , where p s (b) is the share price he receives in his short sales between period 1 and 2 and the term in brackets is the expected price at which he can buy back the shares. Since we assumed that q [ 1, passive shareholders always want to liquidate the project after they observe short sales. If a bailout takes place, the interest rate i* makes these shareholders indifferent between liquidating or not, i.e., independent of a bailout taking place or not, the share price in period 2 after a short sale is p 2 (s) = L À D. A short seller thus gets the following average price when selling her shares between period 1 and 2 p s ðbÞ ¼ ap 1 ðbÞ þ ð1 À aÞðL À DÞ:
The initial share price is given by the expected value of the finally resulting share price p 1 ðbÞ ¼ ð1 À kÞ Â ð1 À qðbÞÞ Â ðp u v À DÞ (uninformed trader who does not trade) þ ð1 À kÞ Â qðbÞ Â ðL À DÞ (predatory short sale) þ k Â ð1 À cÞ Â ðL À DÞ (informed short sale) þ k Â c Â ðp g v À DÞ;
(informed trader goes long)
where q(b) shall denote the equilibrium probability with which an uninformed trader performs a predatory short sale. Note that the bailout probability b affects the initial share price only by its effect on the frequency q(b) of predatory short sales. There is no direct effect of b on the initial share price, because after a short sale passive shareholders are indifferent between a bailout or not. An explicit characterization of q(b) and the implied share prices, profits and welfare for all b turns out to be fairly complex and becomes quickly intractable. We therefore restrict attention to characterizing a minimal bailout probability b that fully deters predatory short sales and we will compare such a deterrence policy with a no bailout policy.
We first note some preliminary results.
Lemma 5 Consider an exogenous decrease in the frequency of predatory short sales q (keeping the bailout probability b and everything else constant). Then expected profits G j of both informed and predatory short sellers increase.
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The intuition why expected profits of short sellers go up if the frequency of predatory short sales goes down is simple. A reduction of predatory short sales increases the initial firm value p 1 , since fewer inefficient liquidations take place. This allows short sellers to sell the shares at a higher price. Furthermore, the expected price at which they have to buy back the shares is unaffected by the probability of short sales.
For the bailout probability b, we find Lemma 6 An increase in the bailout probability b (weakly) reduces the frequency q(b) of predatory short sales and the expected profits G u ðbÞ of predatory short sales and (weakly) increases the expected profits G b ðbÞ of informed short-sellers.
In an equilibrium in which predatory short sales are fully deterred, the initial share price will be given by
The minimal bailout probability b required to deter predatory short sales will depend in a simple fashion on two markups. First, we have the relative markup of the initial share price compared to the period 2 price after a short sale:
A higher markup m 12 , will make short sales more profitable and therefore requires a higher bailout probability to deter predatory short sales. Second, we have the relative markup of a predatory short seller's expected period 3 price over the expected period 3 price of an informed short seller given a bailout:
Intuitively, a higher markup m ub means that a predatory short seller loses more money when he has to buy back the shares in period 3 after a bailout; the required bailout probability to deter predatory short sales will then be lower.
Proposition 2. If the government commits to a bailout probability weakly above the critical level of b ¼ a m 12 m ub ð24Þ then in every equilibrium predatory short sales are fully deterred while the frequency of informed short sales is not affected by the bailout policy. For any bailout probability below b predatory short sales occur with positive probability in equilibrium.
Note that it is not always possible to fully deter predatory short sales with a positive bailout probability, since in certain parameter constellations, we can have b [ 1. On the other hand, it is evident that for sufficiently small ability in order management a, it is always possible to deter predatory short sales. The following result summarizes the comparative statics of the critical bailout probability.
Proposition 3. Ceteris paribus, the minimal bailout probability b to fully deter predatory short sales is decreasing in the liquidation value L and increasing in the trader's ability of order management a, the probability c that the firm is a good type and the probability k that the strategic trader is informed.
Welfare
While predatory short sales can be fully deterred by a bailout probability of b, it is not obvious whether such a bailout policy is desirable from a welfare perspective. This section analyses the welfare effects of such a bailout policy. For a clean exposition, we want to abstract from shadow costs of government funds, which would make bailouts less attractive, and from exogenous positive externalities of bailouts, which would make them more attractive. Neither shall the distribution of expected payoffs among traders, passive shareholders, creditors and taxpayers affect our welfare measure. Consequently, we use the expected total payoff of the firm's project (accounting for the possibility of early liquidation) as welfare measure.
The welfare effect from changing a no-bailout policy to a bailout probability of b, which fully deters predatory short sales, is given as follows:
The first term (I) describes the classical negative effect of the bailouts: prevention of efficient liquidation. Absent bailouts, informative short sales, which happen with probability (1Àc)k, trigger efficient liquidation of a bad project. A bailout prevents this efficient liquidation, which causes a welfare loss of LÀp b v.
The second term (II) describes the positive welfare effect of (ex ante) deterrence of predatory short sales. Under a no-bailout policy, a predatory short sale takes place with probability (1Àk) and the resulting inefficient liquidation yields an expected welfare loss of p u vÀL. This inefficiency is fully removed by a bailout policy that deters predatory short sales.
Comparing the negative and positive effect, we can establish the following result:
Proposition 4. There exists a critical ability in order management a [ 0 such that for all a \ a a fully deterring predatory short sales with a commitment to a bailout probability b strictly increases welfare compared to a no bailout policy.
Distribution of the welfare gains
Taxpayers lose, shareholders gain
The following result shows the distribution of welfare gains and welfare losses when the government commits to a bailout probability of b compared to the absence of bailouts.
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Proposition 5 Assume in an initial period the government moves from a nobailout policy to a welfare improving commitment to bailout with probability b. This policy change leaves expected profits of the firm's creditors unaffected. It causes expected losses for the government, and shareholders make a gain equal to the sum of the total welfare gain and the absolute value of the government's losses.
If predatory short sales are fully deterred, only bad firms will be bailed out and the government will always make losses from its bailouts: The expected value of a bailed-out firm is just p b v, which is below the liquidation value L. Since the highest interest rate i* at which shareholders accept the bailout makes them indifferent between liquidation or not, these ex post welfare losses of the bailout are fully borne by the government. In contrast, the ex ante welfare gains from the new bailout policy are fully captured by the shareholders: the initial equity value (p 1 ) increases since there is no more inefficient premature liquidation caused by predatory short sales. The shareholders' value increases by the total welfare gain plus the absolute value of the expected ex post losses from bailouts borne by the government.
Given that shareholders gain more than the total welfare increase from a commitment to a positive bailout probability, there is scope for redistribution to achieve Pareto-improvements among taxpayers and shareholders without hurting creditors. Two policy instruments for this task are forced bailouts and bailout taxes for shareholders.
Corollary 1 Consider the case that a commitment to a bailout probability b increases total welfare compared to a no-bailout policy. Shareholders still benefit from such a policy change if the government in addition either 1. Decides that shareholders will be forced to accept government bailouts at the interest rate at which the government makes zero losses, even though the shareholders would have preferred to liquidate the project, or 2. Imposes an ex ante bailout tax on the firms such that the government's expected losses from bailouts are covered.
Similar policy instruments are indeed discussed and applied for banks. Forced recapitalizations of banks were discussed and de facto imposed by several countries during the financial crisis. In the European Union, a common resolution fund for insolvent banks is planned for 2016. It will be financed by a bank levy, which can be considered as a form of bailout tax.
Bailouts make informed short sales more profitable
Uninformed strategic traders lose their profits from predatory short sales when the government commits to a bailout probability of b. Yet, if it is welfare optimal to deter predatory short sales, informed short sales will become more profitable if the government commits to a bailout probability b. That is for two reasons. First, given b, short sales reveal a bad firm type. Therefore, bailouts after a short sale do not increase the resulting stock price of a firm but reduces it from the value L À D under liquidation to an expected value of p b v À D. This reduction benefits an informed short seller. Second, if it is welfare optimal to bail out with probability b, the firm's ex ante value and stock price p 1 increase when implementing b. Hence, the informed short seller gets a higher price when originally selling the shares. Both effects increase expected profits of an informed short seller. We summarize these observations in Corollary 2 Changing a zero bailout probability to b increases expected profits of informed short sales (while predatory short sales become unprofitable).
While not formally modeled in our framework, this suggests that strategic traders would have more incentives to spend money to investigate whether a firm has a bad type. This could be another channel how a higher bailout probability increases the informational efficiency of short sales in financial markets.
DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
Commitment of shareholders to refinance after a short sale
Similar to a commitment strategy noted in Goldstein and Guembel (2008) , a firm could also deter predatory short sales if it could commit itself to refinance the project after a short sale at the market interest rate with positive probability. One could therefore question the need for government intervention. We focus on bailouts for the following two reasons.
Compared to a bailout at interest rate i* the expected share price after private refinancing at the market interest rate i is lower by p u (i À i*)D. The larger is the debt level D, the larger is the excess cost of private refinancing over a bailout. Hence, from the perspective of a predatory short seller, private refinancing is less harmful than a bailout because it does not increase the expected period 3 share price by as much. To prevent predatory short sales, the probability to privately refinance after a short sale would have to be strictly above the critical bailout probability b. Since refinancing after a short sale is ex post inefficient, a commitment to privately refinance the project is thus less efficient from a social perspective than an optimal bailout policy.
Second, the credibility of a private commitment to refinance after a short sale is an issue. While credibility could arise from repeated interactions, a single firm may not expect to be a repeated target of predatory short sales. Building up reputation for refinancing may therefore not be very valuable for a single firm. In contrast, the government may have much stronger incentives to build up reputation. Since many firms could potentially be the target of predatory short sales, the continuation game is much more relevant. More importantly, positive externalities from bailouts may weaken or even reverse the commitment problem for the government. We discuss this point in the next subsection.
The reversed commitment problem of the government
A common theme in the literature on bailouts is the following time-inconsistency problem: In good times, governments and central banks do not want to Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts create expectations that they will bail out firms that get in distress. Such expectations could lead to moral hazard behavior, in the form of low managerial effort, excessive risk-taking or the choice of highly correlated strategies (cf. Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Bernardo et al., 2016; Chari and Kehoe, 2013; Farhi and Tirole, 2012) . Once firms are in distress, however, negative external effects of firm closures or gains from rescuing illiquid but solvent firms can make bailouts attractive from a welfare perspective. In consequence, a commitment to a nonbailout policy may not be credible.
In this paper, we obtain the reverse. Raising bailout expectations is welfareoptimal because it deters predatory short selling; the eventual bailout reduces welfare because there are no externalities in our model, and distressed firms in equilibrium are always of bad type and insolvent. The latter also modifies Bagehot's dictum that only insolvent firms should not be bailed out. We obtain that they should, even though it appears to be inefficient ex post. In the literature on bailouts, Cordella and Yeyati (2003) is the only paper that arrives at a similar conclusion. In their model, bailout expectations increase the charter value of banks, which counterbalances the effects of risk-taking incentives.
Using noisy information about the firm's type
When the government can perform an investigation about the firm's type and receive a private signal, it is no longer optimal to perform bailouts randomly. Assume the government observes a noisy signal y 2 R about the firm's type with density function f(y|h). We assume that higher values of y are more likely for a good type, formally the likelihood ratio f(y|h = g)/f(y|h = b) shall be strictly increasing in y. It is then preferable from an ex post perspective to perform bailouts after a high signal rather than after a low signal. Furthermore, higher signals are more likely after a predatory short sale (after which the firm may be a good or bad type) than after an informed short sale (after which the firm is always a bad type). This means a policy that performs bailouts after sufficiently high signals is also better able to deter predatory short sales ex ante than a random bailout policy. We summarize this result in Proposition 6 If the government receives a continuously distributed private noisy signal y, with larger signals being more likely for good firms, a policy of random bailouts is dominated by a policy to perform a bailout if and only if y ! y for some cut-off level y.
This result is more in line with Bagehot's dictum to only bail out solvent firms.
Short sale ban
Finally, we compare a short sale ban with bailouts in our model. A short sale ban means that the strategic trader has only the option to buy shares or to perform no trade. As in our basic model, it is optimal to buy shares if and only if the trader is informed about a good firm type. Given that no stock trades are observed under a short sale ban, passive financial investors' rational belief about the firm's success probability is given bỹ
Ifp 0 v [ L, a short sale ban causes the project to be always refinanced no matter whether the strategic trader buys stocks or not. The short sale ban then yields the same total welfare as a bailout policy with a 100% bailout probability. The total welfare is thus strictly lower than under a bailout policy with the bailout probability b \ 1 that suffices to completely deter predatory short sales. Ifp 0 v \ L, passive investors prefer to liquidate the project if they do not observe that the strategic trader has bought stocks. Intuitively, the absence of good news from the stock market is now interpreted as sufficiently bad news about the firm's type to trigger liquidation. Hence, the short sale ban leads to the same outcome as if in the basic model without bailouts: an uninformed strategic trader always performs predatory short sales. This means that in the case q \ 1 the short sale ban, somewhat paradoxically, even increases the frequency of liquidations and reduces the total welfare compared to the baseline case with short sales and without bailouts. If q ¼ 1 the short sale ban leads to exactly the same outcome as in the basic model without bailouts.
Overall, an optimal bailout policy dominates short sale bans because it allows to selectively reduce predatory short sales while keeping informed short sellers in the market.
CONCLUSION
This paper extends the literature on predatory short selling and bailouts through a joint analysis of the two. We obtain several novel results: Bailing out insolvent firms can increase welfare because it makes uninformed short selling less attractive. Bailouts can thus be optimal ex ante but undesirable ex post. This complements the literature, which focuses on dealing with undesirable ex ante effects (e.g., Bernardo et al., 2016; Chari and Kehoe, 2013; Farhi and Tirole, 2012) . Second, in our model bailouts are a better policy tool than short selling restrictions. This augments theoretical results on the optimality of short sale restrictions obtained by Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2014) , Goldstein and Guembel (2008) and Liu (2015) . Finally, welfare gains are unevenly distributed: shareholders gain while taxpayers lose, which contributes to the debate over the redistribution effects of bailouts (e.g., Acharya et al., 2011) .
To focus our analysis, we have abstracted from externalities of bailouts and from the fact that bailouts can induce moral hazard in form of excessive risk taking. Modeling these important factors can clearly modify the overall assessment of bailouts. Bailouts can turn out to be unattractive if the net effect of externalities and moral hazard is negative and stronger than the positive effect obtained in our model. On the other hand, the new effects that we find should continue to be present. Hence, our analysis does not yield a policy recommendation for governments to perform bailouts, but simply highlights one positive effect of bailouts that has not yet been discussed in the literature.
Predatory Short Sales and Bailouts
Empirically, predatory short sales appear to be a rare animal that is difficult to spot. While some market participants claim their existence 6 the literature does not provide clear positive evidence on the prevalence of manipulative short selling and its effects (e.g., Boehmer and Wu, 2013; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Shkilko et al., 2012) . The lack of empirical evidence could be due to the difficulty of distinguishing informed short sellers from uninformed ones. On the other hand, it is also consistent with our results. In our model, predatory short sales are potentially profitable but become less so in the presence of bailouts; for some parameters, the optimal bailout policy completely deters predatory short sales.
Of course, another explanation for the empirical observations is that, contrary to what we and others assume in our models, market conditions are generally such that predatory short selling is not profitable. Even if this were true, our findings would contribute to the policy debate. Governments and regulators continue to implement or consider short selling restrictions. 7 Our model shows that such restrictions are not necessarily the best instrument for combating negative effects of short selling, even if one does not doubt that short selling can have such effects.
Proof of Lemma 2. If an informed trader who knows that the firm type is bad does not trade he makes zero profits and if he buys stocks, it follows from Lemma 1 that he makes losses in expectation. We now show that in every equilibrium an informed trader can guarantee strictly positive expected profits by short selling shares. A short sale is profitable if the expected resulting share price is below p 1 . If the short sale leads to liquidation, the share price drops from p 1 ≥ p u v À D to p 2 = L À D < p u v À D, which renders the short sale profitable. Alternatively, there is no liquidation after the short sale. For the informed trader the expected resulting stock price in t 3 is then given by
The interest rate i depends on passive shareholders' beliefsp about the success probability
To show that the expected final share price will drop after a short sale, we must distinguish different cases.
1. Consider an equilibrium in which short sales are only performed by an informed trader who knows that the firm is a bad type. Then a short sale reveals to passive investors that the firm is a bad type, such thatp ¼ p b . The expected stock price in t 3 then simplifies to p b v À D, which is strictly below the original price p 1 . 2. Consider an equilibrium in which on the equilibrium path short sales take place with zero probability. Assumption 1 then guarantees that after an outoff-equilibrium short sale passive investors hold beliefs that satisfyp p u . This guarantees that a short sale will be profitable for the informed trader, since (26) satisfies p b ðv À ð1 þ iÞDÞ p b ðv À 1 p u DÞ p u v À D\p 1 :
3. Consider an equilibrium in which on the equilibrium path an uninformed strategic trader or an informed trader who knows that the firm type is good perform short sales with positive probability. These trader types must make non-negative expected profits from a short sale since they can reach a zero payoff by simply not trading. If a short sale always leads to liquidation, the short sale is always profitable, as pointed out above. If there is a positive probability that a short sale does not lead to liquidation, the expected final stock price is strictly lower for the informed trader who knows that the firm type is bad than for an uninformed strategic trader who performs short sales; hence the informed strategic trader must make strictly positive expected profits from the short sale in this case.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let q be the probability that an uninformed strategic trader performs predatory short sales. A predatory short sale then happens with probability (1 À k)q while an informed short sale happens with probability (1 À c)k.
Hence, after observing a short-sale passive investors' rational beliefs about the project's success probability are given bỹ
Passive shareholders will weakly prefer liquidation after short sales if and only if pðsjqÞv L, which is equivalent toð1 À cÞ k ð1 À kÞ ðL À p b vÞ ðp u v À LÞ :
Proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemmas 4-6. Are straightforward or follow directly from the derivations above the results. For Lemma 5, observe that according to (20) , the initial share price p 1 is decreasing in q.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that for a given bailout probability b all predatory short sales are deterred, i.e., no uninformed trader performs a short sale. We analyze for which b uninformed traders make indeed no positive profits from a deviation to a predatory short sale. Straightforward algebra shows that if a goes to zero, the critical bailout probability b needed to fully deter predatory short sales also goes to zero. This means also the negative welfare effect that predatory short sales prevent efficient liquidation goes to zero. In comparison, the positive effect from deterring predatory short sales is independent of a. This means for sufficiently small a the positive effect outweighs the negative effect. The resulting share price at which an uninformed short-seller must buy back the shares can be written as b p 3 ðuÞ þ ð1 À bÞðL À DÞ ¼ bð p u p b ðL À DÞÞ þ ð1 À bÞðL À DÞÞ ¼ ð1 þ bm ub ÞðL À DÞ
A predatory short seller's ex ante expected profits per share, given that no predatory short sales take place in equilibrium, can then be written as
We see that these deviation profits are strictly decreasing in the bailout probability b. Setting G d u equal to zero and solving for b, yields the critical bailout probability of b ¼ að p d 1 À ðL À DÞ L À D Þ=m ub ¼ a m 12 m ub :
It follows from the monotonicity results in Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 that for b [ b predatory short sales are deterred in all equilibria, while for b \ b there can be no equilibrium in which predatory short sales are fully deterred.
interest rate i* that makes shareholders indifferent between accepting the bailout or liquidating, the initial stock market value of the firm simply becomes p u v À D þ ð1 À cÞkðL À p b vÞ:
This means even though some of the bad projects after a short sale are bailed out instead of being liquidated, the shareholders have the same expected profits, as if there was always liquidation after an informed short sale. The expected ex post inefficiencies from the bailouts (1 À c)kb(L À p b v) are solely borne by the government.
Proof of Proposition 6. Straightforward. See the discussion above the result.
